

Communicable Crypto

What can cryptographers prove?

What do people need?

How can we bridge the gap?

RWC2016

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Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, ACLU

0EE5 BE97 9282 D80B 9F75 40F1 CCD2 ED94 D217 39E9

ACLU Goals

- Freedom of Speech
- Freedom of Association
- Equality and Justice
- Privacy

For everyone!

Our Opposition

- Censorship
- Discrimination
- Surveillance
- Chilled speech

Censorship and Surveillance

- Surveillance of content → censoring topics
- Surveillance of metadata → censoring people

Surveillance alone

- Information is power
- Information differentials are power differentials
 - Prediction
 - Manipulation
 - Control

Chilling effects



Surveillance plus threat = internalized censorship

Communication and growth

- Personal
- Social

For Everyone

- Who is subject to surveillance?
- Who is at risk from threats?
- Does defense alone raise suspicion?

How do we reach the most vulnerable?

- Infrastructure
- Defaults
- Clarity

Clarity is Key

- Misunderstandings are dangerous
- What does your cryptographic tool, protocol, or construct do?
- What does the user understand?

Who is the user of crypto?

- End users
- System Administrators
- Application Developers
- Library Developers
- Protocol Designers

End users

- Clear/simple concepts
- Graphical indicators
- Straightforward workflows
- Defaults

End users



The image shows a browser window displaying the website for the Real World Cryptography Conference. The browser's address bar shows the URL www.realworldcrypto.com. The website features a large logo on the left consisting of the letters 'RC' stacked above 'W'. The main heading is 'Real World Cryptography Conference'. Below the heading, there is an 'Overview' section with a red underline. The text describes the conference's goal to bring together cryptography researchers and developers. It also mentions the 2016 edition will be held in Stanford, CA on January 6-8, 2016, and provides a link to the 'workshop website'. On the left side, there are sections for 'Upcoming RWC conference:' with a link to '2016', 'Past conferences:' with links for '2015', '2014', '2013', and '2012', 'The Levchin Prize:' with a link to 'nominations', and 'Social media:'. At the bottom of the left sidebar, there is a section for 'The Levchin Prize' with a red underline.

RealWorldCrypto x

← → ↻ www.realworldcrypto.com ☆ ☰

RC W

Real World Cryptography Conference

Upcoming RWC conference:

- [2016](#)

Past conferences:

- [2015](#)
- [2014](#)
- [2013](#)
- [2012](#)

The Levchin Prize:

- [nominations](#)

Social media:


Overview

This annual conference aims to bring together cryptography researchers with developers implementing cryptography in real-world systems. The conference goal is to strengthen the dialogue between these two communities. Topics covered focus on uses of cryptography in real-world environments such as the Internet, the cloud, and embedded devices.


The 2016 edition of the workshop will be held in Stanford, CA on January 6-8, 2016. For further details, visit the [workshop website](#).

The Levchin Prize


End users



End users



End users



End users

The screenshot shows an email client interface with an 'Inbox' tab. The top toolbar includes 'Get Messages', 'Write', 'Chat', 'Address Book', 'Tag', 'Quick Filter', and 'Decrypt'. Below the toolbar is a search bar with the text 'Filter these messages... <Ctrl+Shift+K>'. The inbox list shows several messages, with the selected one being 'Please approve the blog post for Friday' from Daniel Kahn Gillmor, dated 03:05 AM. The open message details show the sender as Daniel Kahn Gillmor, subject as 'Please approve the blog post for Friday', and a redacted recipient. The message body contains the following text:

Thanks
--
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Technology Fellow
Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project
American Civil Liberties Union
+1.212.284.7336
OpenPGP fingerprint: 0EE5 BE97 9282 D80B 9F75 40F1 CCD2 ED94 D217 39E9

At the bottom of the interface, it displays 'Unread: 126 Total: 9855' and a 'Today Pane' icon.

System Administrators

- Complexity → failure
- Config files/dialogs
- Making decisions for other people
- Common patterns/tradeoffs
- Logging/alerts
- Defaults

System Administrators

mod_ssl - Apache HTTP Ser... x

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_ssl.html

Apache HTTP Server Version 2.4

Apache > HTTP Server > Documentation > Version 2.4 > Modules

Apache Module mod_ssl

Available Languages: en | fr

Description: Strong cryptography using the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols
Status: Extension
Module Identifier: ssl_module
Source File: mod_ssl.c

Summary

This module provides SSL v3 and TLS v1.x support for the Apache HTTP Server. SSL v2 is no longer supported.

This module relies on [OpenSSL](#) to provide the cryptography engine.

Further details, discussion, and examples are provided in the [SSL documentation](#).

Environment Variables

This module can be configured to provide several items of SSL information as additional environment variables to the SSI and CGI namespace. This information is not provided by default for performance reasons. (See [SSLOptions](#) StdEnvVars, below.) The generated variables are listed in the table below. For backward compatibility the information can be made available under different names, too. Look in the [Compatibility](#) chapter for details on the compatibility variables.

Variable Name:	Value Type:	Description:
HTTPS	flag	HTTPS is being used.
SSL_PROTOCOL	string	The SSL protocol version (SSLv3, TLSv1, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2)
SSL_SESSION_ID	string	The hex-encoded SSL session id
SSL_SESSION_RESUMED	string	Initial or Resumed SSL Session. Note: multiple requests may be served over the same (Initial or Resumed) SSL session if HTTP KeepAlive is in use
SSL_SECURE_RENEG	string	<code>true</code> if secure renegotiation is supported, else <code>false</code>
SSL_CIPHER	string	The cipher specification name
SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT	string	<code>true</code> if cipher is an export cipher
SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE	number	Number of cipher bits (actually used)
SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE	number	Number of cipher bits (possible)
SSL_COMPRESS_METHOD	string	SSL compression method negotiated
SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE	string	The mod_ssl program version
SSL_VERSION_LIBCRYPTO	string	The OpenSSL program version
SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION	string	The version of the client certificate
SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL	string	The serial of the client certificate
SSL_CLIENT_S_DN	string	Subject DN in client's certificate
SSL_CLIENT_S_DN_o_509	string	Component of client's Subject DN
SSL_CLIENT_SAM_Ext+1_n	string	Client certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type rfc822Name
SSL_CLIENT_SAM_DNS_n	string	Client certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type dNSName

Topics

- Environment Variables
- Custom Log Formats
- Request Notes
- Expression Parser Extension
- Authorization providers for use with Require

Directives

- SSLCACertificateFile
- SSLCACertificatePath
- SSLCADNRequestFile
- SSLCADNRequestPath
- SSLCARevocationCheck
- SSLCARevocationFile
- SSLCARevocationPath
- SSLCertificateChainFile
- SSLCertificateFile
- SSLCertificateKeyFile
- SSLCipherSuite
- SSLCompression
- SSLCryptoDevice
- SSLEngine
- SSLFIPS
- SSLHonorCipherOrder
- SSLInsecureRenegotiation
- SSLOCSPDefaultResponder
- SSLOCSPEnable
- SSLOCSPOverrideResponder
- SSLOCSPResponderTimeout
- SSLOCSPResponseMaxAge
- SSLOCSPResponseTimeSkew
- SSLOCSPUseRequestNonce
- SSLOpenSSLConfCmd
- SSLOptions
- SSLPassPhraseDialog
- SSLProtocol
- SSLProxyCACertificateFile
- SSLProxyCACertificatePath
- SSLProxyCARevocationCheck
- SSLProxyCARevocationFile
- SSLProxyCARevocationPath
- SSLProxyCheckPeerCN
- SSLProxyCheckPeerExpire
- SSLProxyCheckPeerName
- SSLProxyCipherSuite
- SSLProxyEngine
- SSLProxyMachineCertificateCh...
- SSLProxyMachineCertificateFi...

System Administrators

mod_ssl - Apache HTTP Ser... x

https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_ssl.html

SSL_CLIENT_SAH_Dnmail_n	string	Client certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type rfc822Name
SSL_CLIENT_SAH_DNS_n	string	Client certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type DNSName
SSL_CLIENT_SAH_OTHER_dnsUPN_n	string	Client certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type otherName, Microsoft User Principal Name form (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.3)
SSL_CLIENT_I_DN	string	Issuer DN of client's certificate
SSL_CLIENT_I_DN_x509	string	Component of client's Issuer DN
SSL_CLIENT_U_START	string	Validity of client's certificate (start time)
SSL_CLIENT_U_END	string	Validity of client's certificate (end time)
SSL_CLIENT_U_REMAIN	string	Number of days until client's certificate expires
SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG	string	Algorithm used for the signature of client's certificate
SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY	string	Algorithm used for the public key of client's certificate
SSL_CLIENT_CERT	string	PEM-encoded client certificate
SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_n	string	PEM-encoded certificates in client certificate chain
SSL_CLIENT_CERT RFC4512_CEA	string	Serial number and issuer of the certificate. The format matches that of the CertificateExactAssertion in RFC4523
SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY	string	NONE, SUCCESS, GENERAL or FAILED:reason
SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION	string	The version of the server certificate
SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL	string	The serial of the server certificate
SSL_SERVER_S_DN	string	Subject DN in server's certificate
SSL_SERVER_SAH_Dnmail_n	string	Server certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type rfc822Name
SSL_SERVER_SAH_DNS_n	string	Server certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type DNSName
SSL_SERVER_SAH_OTHER_dnsSRV_n	string	Server certificate's subjectAltName extension entries of type otherName, SRVName form (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7, RFC 4085)
SSL_SERVER_S_DN_x509	string	Component of server's Subject DN
SSL_SERVER_I_DN	string	Issuer DN of server's certificate
SSL_SERVER_I_DN_x509	string	Component of server's Issuer DN
SSL_SERVER_U_START	string	Validity of server's certificate (start time)
SSL_SERVER_U_END	string	Validity of server's certificate (end time)
SSL_SERVER_A_SIG	string	Algorithm used for the signature of server's certificate
SSL_SERVER_A_KEY	string	Algorithm used for the public key of server's certificate
SSL_SERVER_CERT	string	PEM-encoded server certificate
SSL_SRP_USER	string	SRP username
SSL_SRP_USERINFO	string	SRP user info
SSL_TLS_SNI	string	Contents of the SNI TLS extension (if supplied with ClientHello)

x509 specifies a component of an X.509 DN; one of c,ST,L,O,OU,CN,T,1,6,3,D,UID,Dnmail. In Apache 2.1 and later, x509 may also include a numeric _n suffix. If the DN in question contains multiple attributes of the same name, this suffix is used as a zero-based index to select a particular attribute. For example, where the server certificate subject DN included two OU attributes, SSL_SERVER_S_DN_OU_0 and SSL_SERVER_S_DN_OU_1 could be used to reference each. A variable name without a _n suffix is equivalent to that name with a _0 suffix; the first (or only) attribute. When the environment table is populated using the %aDn%v%v option of the [SSLOptions](#) directive, the first (or only) attribute of any DN is added only under a non-suffixed name; i.e. no _0 suffixed entries are added.

The format of the *_DN variables has changed in Apache HTTPD 2.3.11. See the LegacyDnStringFormat option for [SSLOptions](#) for details.


SSL_CLIENT_U_REMAIN is only available in version 2.1 and later.

A number of additional environment variables can also be used in [SSLRequire](#) expressions, or in custom log formats:

HTTP_USER_AGENT	PATH_INFO	AUTH_TYPE
HTTP_REFERER	QUERY_STRING	SERVER_SOFTWARE
HTTP_COOKIE	REMOTE_HOST	SSL_PROTOCOL

SSLProxyMachineCertificateCh
SSLProxyMachineCertificateFil
SSLProxyMachineCertificatePat
SSLProxyProtocol
SSLProxyVerify
SSLProxyVerifyDepth
SSLRandomSeed
SSLRenegBufferSize
SSLRequire
SSLRequireSSL
SSLSessionCache
SSLSessionCacheTimeout
SSLSessionTicketKeyFile
SSLSessionTickets
SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed
SSLSRPVerifierFile
SSLStaplingCache
SSLStaplingErrorCacheTimeout
SSLStaplingFakeTlvLater
SSLStaplingForceURL
SSLStaplingResponderTimeout
SSLStaplingResponseMaxAge
SSLStaplingResponseTimeSkew
SSLStaplingReturnResponderExt
SSLStaplingStandardCacheTime
SSLStrictSNIvHostCheck
SSLUserName
SSLUseStapling
SSLVerifyClient
SSLVerifyDepth
Comments

System Administrators



Why SSLMate?

Simple Security

Get SSL certificates from the command line in under 60 seconds. No complicated openssl commands or copy-and-pasting certificate bundles. It's as easy as typing

```
sslmate buy example.com.
```

[Watch the demo](#) ▶

Automate your SSL

SSLMate certificates automatically renew and install on your server, eliminating human error. SSLMate can even integrate with your configuration management for automated deployment.

A+ Security

SSLMate helps configure your server with the most up-to-date security practices, so you can protect your visitors and get an A+ rating from SSL Labs—the gold standard of SSL security.

System Administrators



Let's Encrypt


System Administrators



Let's Encrypt

```
caddy@mattman:~$ nano Cad_
```

System Administrators



Application Developers

- Complexity is expensive
- Library API
- Error handling
- Maintenance and Lifecycle
- Make failure findable
- Defaults

Application Developers

CVE - Search Results x +

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=certificate

Terminology
Documents
FAQs
CVE List
CVE-ID Syntax Change
About CVE Identifiers
Search CVE
Search NVD
Updates & RSS Feeds
Request a CVE-ID
CVE In Use
CVE-Compatible Products
NVD for CVE Fix Information
CVSS for Scoring CVE-IDs
CVE Numbering Authorities (CNAs)
News & Events
Calendar
Free Newsletter
Community
CVE Editorial Board
Sponsor
Contact Us
Search the Site
Site Map


There are **2048** CVE entries that match your search.

Name	Description
CVE-2015-7298	ownCloud Desktop Client before 2.0.1, when compiled with a Qt release after 5.3.x, does not call QNetworkReply::ignoreSslErrors with the list of errors to be ignored, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks by leveraging a server using a self-signed certificate. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of a partial CVE-2015-4456 regression.
CVE-2015-7061	The ASN.1 decoder in Apple OS X before 10.11.2, tvOS before 9.1, and watchOS before 2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted certificate, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-7059 and CVE-2015-7060.
CVE-2015-7060	The ASN.1 decoder in Apple OS X before 10.11.2, tvOS before 9.1, and watchOS before 2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted certificate, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-7059 and CVE-2015-7061.
CVE-2015-7059	The ASN.1 decoder in Apple OS X before 10.11.2, tvOS before 9.1, and watchOS before 2.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted certificate, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-7060 and CVE-2015-7061.
CVE-2015-6999	The OCSP client in Apple iOS before 9.1 does not check for certificate expiry, which allows remote attackers to spoof a valid certificate by leveraging access to a revoked certificate.
CVE-2015-6997	The X.509 certificate-trust implementation in Apple iOS before 9.1 does not recognize that the kSecRevocationRequirePositiveResponse flag implies a revocation-checking requirement, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof endpoints by leveraging access to a revoked certificate.
CVE-2015-6932	VMware vCenter Server 5.5 before u3 and 6.0 before u1 does not verify X.509 certificates from TLS LDAP servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate.
CVE-2015-6357	The rule-update feature in Cisco FireSIGHT Management Center (MC) 5.2 through 5.4.0.1 does not verify the X.509 certificate of the support.sourcefire.com SSL server, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof this server and provide an invalid package, and consequently execute arbitrary code, via a crafted certificate, aka Bug ID CSCuw06444.
CVE-2015-6303	The Cisco Spark application 2015-07-04 for mobile operating systems does not properly verify X.509 certificates from SSL servers, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof servers and obtain sensitive information via a crafted certificate, aka Bug IDs CSCut36742 and CSCut36844.
CVE-2015-6298	The admin web interface in Cisco AsyncOS 8.x before 8.0.8-113, 8.1.x before 8.5.3-051, 8.6.x before 8.7.0-171-LD, and 8.8.x before 8.8.0-085 on Web Security Appliance (WSA) devices allows remote authenticated users to obtain root privileges via crafted certificate-generation arguments, aka Bug ID CSCus83445.
CVE-2015-6276	Cisco TelePresence IX5000 8.0.3 stores a private key associated with an X.509 certificate under the web root with insufficient access control, which allows remote attackers to obtain cleartext versions of HTTPS traffic or spoof devices via a direct request to the certificate directory, aka Bug ID CSCuu63501.
CVE-2015-6251	Double free vulnerability in GnuTLS before 3.3.17 and 3.4.x before 3.4.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a long DistinctiveName (DN) entry in a certificate.


Search Master Copy of CVE
Download CVE
View CVE
CVE-ID Syntax Change
CVE-ID Syntax Compliance
CVE-ID Syntax Guidance
CVE-ID Syntax Test Data
About CVE Identifiers
Data Sources/Product Coverage
Editorial Policies
CVE Editor's Commentary
Reference Key/Maps
Search Tips
Updates & RSS Feeds
Request a CVE Identifier

ITEMS OF INTEREST
Terminology
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRP)
National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

Application Developers



Application Developers



The Update Framework (TUF) b... x +

https://theupdateframework.github.io


The Update Framework (TUF)

Like the S in HTTPS, a plug-and-play library for securing a software updater

A Framework for Securing Software Update Systems

The Update Framework (TUF) helps developers secure their new or existing software update systems. Software update systems are vulnerable to many known attacks, including those that can result in clients being compromised or crashed. TUF helps solve this problem by providing a flexible security framework that can be added to software updaters.

Application Developers



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Debian Code Search" and the URL "https://codesearch.debian.net/". The page features a search bar with a "Search" button, a navigation menu with "Search", "About Code Search", and "FAQ", and a footer with copyright information and a "rackspace" logo.

Debian Code Search

Search all 130 GiB of source code within Debian:

Search

[See the FAQ for supported keywords](#)

© 2012-2014 Debian Code Search - [Contact / Send Feedback](#)

POWERED BY **rackspace**

Library Developers

- What features should they expose?
- API lifecycle management
- Test vectors
- Formal verification
- Defaults

Library Developers

0-RTT TLS:

```
TLS_connect(ctx, params);
```

```
TLS_send(ctx, sz, data);
```

```
TLS_connect_with_replayable_data
```

```
(ctx, params, sz, data);
```

```
TLS_send_replayable(ctx, sz, data);
```

Library Developers

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `http://www.mitls.org/pages/flextls`. The navigation menu includes `miTLS`, `Publications`, `Attacks`, `Code`, and `FlexTLS`. The main heading is **FlexTLS: A Tool for Testing TLS Implementations**. The text describes FlexTLS as a tool for prototyping and testing TLS implementations, built on a robust library for messaging and cryptography. It mentions its use in discovering attacks like SKIP and FREAK, and its role in testing proposed designs for TLS 1.3. The diagram illustrates the modular architecture of FlexTLS, showing its components and dependencies.

FlexTLS


- ClientHello
- ServerHello
- Base**
 - Types
 - Constants
 - Secrets
 - State
 - Connection

miTLS Subset

- Platform**
 - CoreCrypto
 - Bytes
 - TCP
 - TLSConstants
- Handshake

Logos for Inria, Microsoft Research, and Handshake are visible at the bottom of the diagram.

Library Developers



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `https://getdnsapi.net`. The page features a navigation bar with links for "getdns API", "Documentation", "Code Repository", and "Developer Information". The main content area includes the "getdns" logo with the tagline "Unbound security" and a paragraph describing the API as a modern asynchronous DNS API. To the right, there is a "Try getdns!" section with a text input field labeled "enter domain name" and a "Simple Query" button. Below this is a "Subscribe to lists" section. The browser's status bar at the bottom shows a security warning: "Scripts Currently Forbidden | <SCRIPT>: 6 | <OBJECT>: 0" and a privacy notice: "Iceweasel automatically sends some data to Mozilla so that we can improve your experience."

Protocol Designers

- How do primitives fit together?
- What properties do they provide?
- Sidechannels
- Deployment/interop/upgrade/deprecation
- Defaults

Protocol Designers

- TLS mac-then-encrypt
 - Replace with AEAD
- OpenPGP SEIPD degradation
 - Deprecate SED (+ design chunkable encryption mechanism)
- DNS privacy

Protocol Designers

IRTF Research Groups ▾ People ▾ Other ▾

Crypto Forum Research Group CFRG

Charter

The Crypto Forum Research Group ([CFRG](#)) is a general forum for discussing and reviewing uses of cryptographic mechanisms, both for network security in general and for the [IETF](#) in particular.

The [CFRG](#) serves as a bridge between theory and practice, bringing new cryptographic techniques to the Internet community and promoting an understanding of the use and applicability of these mechanisms via Informational RFCs (in the tradition of, e.g., [RFC 1321](#) (MD5) and [RFC 2104](#) (HMAC)). Our goal is to provide a forum for discussing and analyzing general cryptographic aspects of security protocols, and to offer guidance on the

CHAIRS

The CFRG is chaired by [Kenny Paterson](mailto:kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk) (kenny.paterson@rhul.ac.uk) and [Alexey Melnikov](mailto:alexey.melnikov@isode.com) (alexey.melnikov@isode.com).

MAILING LIST

Cryptographers are not...

- UI/UX people
- Configuration specialists
- Application developers
- API wizards
- Protocol designers

Most Cryptographers are not yet...

- UI/UX people
- Configuration specialists
- Software engineers
- API developers
- Protocol designers

Collaboration

- Practice explaining what guarantees your constructs can offer
- Listen to user needs
- Sometimes the best solution doesn't involve new crypto
- Without crypto, we lose on surveillance, censorship, discrimination, and privacy