

# InterMAClib: Beyond Confidentiality and Integrity in Practice

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Joint work with

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
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
# The next ~25 mins



Symmetric encryption

Modelling security

AE




Good approximation?

[BKNo2]

SSH CBC-mode is secure!

[APWo9]

SSH CBC-mode is **not** secure!



SSH packets contains a length field


# Security notions



~~IND-CCA~~  $\longrightarrow$  **IND-sfCFA**

~~IND-CTXT~~  $\longrightarrow$  **IND-sfCTF**

# Security notions



~~IND-CCA~~



IND-sfCFA

~~IND-CTXT~~



IND-sfCTF


BH-sfCFA

## SSH:

- Length field encrypted
- Random amount of padding

# Security notions



## (Open)SSH EtM cryptographic processing



# InterMAC



[BDPS12]

Achieve all 4 security notions






# InterMAC in practice



# InterMAC in practice



# InterMAClib

C-implementation

Aims to be "safe" to use

Small API

User-oblivious nonce-management

Algorithm agility


AES-GCM

ChaCha20-Poly1305

# Nonce management

`im_init(..., ae_cipher) :`

chunk counter = 0  
message counter = 0



InterMAC with ChaCha20-Poly1305

$K_{\text{mac}} \leftarrow \text{ChaCha20}(0, K, \text{nonce}, \text{block\_counter} = 0)$

rfc7539 AE  
construction

$C \leftarrow \text{ChaCha20}(M, K, \text{nonce}, \text{block\_counter} = 1)$

$\text{Tag} \leftarrow \text{Poly1305}(K_{\text{mac}}, C)$

InterMAC with AES-GCM

Initialise aes-gcm with nonce for each chunk

We implemented InterMAC-based cipher modes in OpenSSH (v7.4)

Want cipher modes with all 4 security properties


No current cipher mode satisfy that...

[ADHP16]

im-aes128-gcm-N

im-chacha-poly-N

SSH packet



Standalone code-path in the OpenSSH packet processing code

[APW09]

[PW10]

[ADHP16]

OpenSSH packet processing code: complex and buggy

Performance of InterMAC-based cipher modes compared to existing cipher modes

Throughput

Total bytes transmitted


Behavior relating to chunk length N

AWS  
London



AWS  
US-Oregon

Throughput (100MB file)




[ADHP16]



AWS  
London



AWS  
US-Oregon


Throughput (100MB file)







# Finish line is in sight...



Implementations must cater for ciphertext fragmentation

We believe this feature should be reflected in the security models

[BDPS12] provides a security model for studying symmetric encryption schemes supporting ciphertext fragmentation

InterMAC satisfies all security notions from [BDPS12]

We modify InterMAC to make it usable in practice and create InterMAClib

OpenSSH want cipher modes that meets all security notions from [BDPS12]

We implement InterMAC-based cipher modes in OpenSSH using InterMAClib

InterMAC: SSH binary packet protocol done right, using modern primitives

We measured performance; indicates that greater security can be traded for only a minor performance hit

Hi Bob,  
I believe we  
can beat Eve!

CrApto...



FINISH

Real World  
Class Alice!

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